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I. INTRODUCTION
Rehypothecation means that the collateral posted by a prime brokerage client (e.g., hedge fund) to their prime broker can be used as collateral also by the prime broker for its own purposes.
2 Every Customer Account Agreement or Prime Brokerage Agreement with a prime brokerage client will include a blanket consent to this practice unless stated otherwise. Market sources suggest that rehypothecation of assets has historically been a cheaper way of financing the prime business than turning to the repo market. 3 In Section II we describe the differences between rehypothecation rules in the United States and in the United Kingdom.
In the United Kingdom and Europe, such use of a customer's or hedge fund's assets by a prime broker can be for an unlimited amount of the customer's pledged assets. However, there are no customer protection rules such as those offered under the Securities Act of 1933 in the United States. In Section III, we show evidence that, following Lehman's bankruptcy, rehypothecation is becoming much more limited. While this may reduce counterparty risk, it can in turn aggravate global liquidity risk. In the concluding section, we highlight the need to discuss reduced rehypothecation as it is likely to continue.
II. REHYPOTHECATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
A defined set of customer protection rules for rehypothecated assets exists in the United States, but not in the United Kingdom. This difference meant that when Lehman Brothers International (Europe) filed for insolvency, there was no statutory protection available to those customers as the United Kingdom insolvency regime is not specific to entity type. In the United States, however, the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) of 1970 provides for certain procedures that will apply in the event of the insolvency of a broker-dealer. Hence, the customers of Lehman Brothers Inc. (U.S.) could potentially be treated more advantageously than the U.K. customers of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) in terms of the timing and identification of the return of rehypothecated assets. The customer protection rule is designed to work in conjunction with the Federal bankruptcy scheme for broker-dealers created by SIPA.
In the United Kingdom, rehypothecation can be for an unlimited amount of the customer's assets and there are no customer protection rules such as Rule 15c3-3 in the United States.
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(see Appendix 1). Rule 15c3-3 prevents a broker-dealer from using its customers securities to finance its proprietary activities. Under Rule 15c3-3, the broker-dealer may use/rehypothecate an amount up to 140 percent of the customer's debit balance (i.e. borrowing from the broker-dealer).
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Created by SIPA, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is an important part of the overall system of investor protection in the United States. SIPC's focus is very specific: restoring funds to investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt and otherwise financially troubled brokerage firms (e.g., Lehman). Since 1970, SIPC has accumulated almost $2 billion from its members' assessments that can be used by investors to recover assets during insolvency.
A key reason why hedge funds may have previously opted for funding in Europe is that leverage is not capped as in the United States via the 140 percent rule under Rule 15c3-3. Leverage levels at many U.K. hedge funds, banks and financial affiliates have been higher, as both United Kingdom (and continental Europe) do not have a parallel to SIPA. 6 Thus, prime brokers and banks would rehypothecate their client's assets along with their own proprietary assets as collateral for funding from the global financial system. However, since the U.K.'s bankruptcy law does not make a distinction between banks and broker-dealers and does not provide the associated protection from broker-dealers (like SIPA in the United States), hedge fund assets remain frozen in the United Kingdom, whereas thanks to SIPA, this is not the case in the United States. Disentangling hedge fund assets from the broker-dealer/banks' proprietary assets that have been rehypothecated together, will remain an onerous task in the United Kingdom.
Rehypothecation is allowed only on margin securities in the United States. Fully-paid securities, which are the securities for which a customer has actually made full payment, are generally held in the cash account and are not permitted to be rehypothecated. Excess margin securities, which are that portion of a customer's margin securities having a market value that exceeds 140 percent of the customer's debit balance to the broker-dealer, are also not permitted to be rehypothecated. Margin securities, which are customer securities held in a margin account and for which the customer has not made full payment, are not subject to the possession and control requirement, so a broker-dealer can use these securities in its own business-including rehypothecation-subject to certain limitations.
III. REHYPOTHECATION AFTER LEHMAN'S BANKRUPTCY
Based on recent 10Q reports, rehypothecation is declining rapidly. After Lehman's bankruptcy, prime brokers have been demanding more cash collateral in place of securities (unless they are highly liquid securities). Liquidator PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) confirmed in October 2008 that certain assets provided to Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE) were rehypothecated and no longer held for the client on a segregated basis and as a result the client may no longer have a proprietary interest in the assets. 7 As such, investors of LBIE fell within the general body of unsecured creditors. Hedge funds often use their securities for their own repo trades and financing of their own positions, and are increasingly seeking to ensure that assets that have not been pledged as collateral are kept in segregated client accounts, so that prime brokers have absolutely no claim over the assets in them. Segregated accounts, broadly speaking, includes sweeping non-collateral assets into custody accounts, restricting rehypothecation rights, using multiple prime-brokers, and applying for client money protection as under U.K. FSA's Client Money Rules. 8 Some investors have now taken precautionary measures against the practice by taking term loans from large banks and sweeping assets which are not being used as collateral by the prime brokers. The (former) investment banks are now showing a trend away from rehypothecation (Table 1) . We measure this from their 10Q and 10K filings by subtracting the collateral that was pledged from the collateral received. The latest data show that since end-2007 the decline in rehypothecation (i.e., total collateral received that can be pledged) by the largest four broker-dealers was $1.774 trillion. Table 2 ). Source: 10Q and 10K reports 9 JPMorgan's recent 10Q and 10K reports show an increase in 'collateral received that can be pledged' due to the combined reporting of Bear Stearns and the perception of 'being close to Fed' bank. It is difficult to disentangle these and other issues that contributed to a growth in this area for JPMorgan.
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The above are the three major custodians and not the entire financial system; the reduction, due to the aversion to rehypothecation and reduced securities lending globally, is likely to be much higher as the number of investors who are banning the lending of securities by their custodians continues to grow.
Overall, good collateral is increasingly getting scarce in the present credit crisis (Duffie and Zhu, 2009 ). Since December 2007, the recent 10Qs of the large four (former) investment banks show a reduction of almost $1.8 trillion in 'collateral received that can be pledged' i.e., a sharp decline in rehypothecated collateral. Also, between the major three global custodian banks there has been a decline of about $750 billion since December 2007 in collateral flowing in the global financial system. This decline stems from their own counterparty risk, mandate constraints from their clients, and the deleveraging that is taking place. This reduced liquidity of over $2.5 trillion in the United States banking system alone, adds to the cost of funding in the financial system.
Before Lehman, high grade collateral was encouraged to be pledged, repledged and rehypothecated. If collateral could not be rehypothecated, though, the entire financial system would be put at risk as this was the basis of so much activity in the system (Segoviano and Singh, 2008 While the use of collateral mitigates counterparty risk, it can aggravate funding liquidity risk because counterparties have to provide additional collateral at short notice if conditions change. 11 During the recent turmoil, shortages of high-quality collateral emerged prompting special operations by central banks.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having access to high quality collateral did not always guarantee that troubled institutions could maintain access to wholesale funding, as evidenced in the case of Bear Stearns. However, presently major financial institutions worldwide have either increased or created sizable liquidity buffers of high-grade collateral, and cash. This is a rational response in the aftermath of Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG.
Following the collapse of Lehman, hedge funds have become more cognizant of the way the client money and asset regime operates in the United Kingdom. For some, the United Kingdom provides a platform for higher leveraging (and deleveraging) not available in the United States.
12 For others-especially those affected adversely by the Lehman bankruptcy -if jurisdictions like the United Kingdom do not provide for swift bankruptcy resolution (or a SIPC type institution like in the United States) they will limit rehypothecation. The trend so far from Table 1 is an overall aversion to rehypothecation. Does reduced rehypothecation encourage secured lending (e.g., repo market)? Adrian and Shin (2009) show a declining trend in primary dealer repo activity (adjusted for M2) that is contributing towards the credit crunch. 13 In the present financial crisis, overnight inter-bank banks (e.g., fed funds) rates have dropped with liquidity injections, so repo rates and rebate rates approach zero, which means that failure to return collateral has a small penalty (at least until the new delivery failure penalties are approved and kick in). Thus, there was an increasing number of delivery failures in the repo market last fall, and such failures are still continuing, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent. This further disrupts the supply of collateral, because collateral can then be hoarded at trivial penalties. The resulting deleveraging is leading to dislocations in the cash bond market (e.g., negative basis).
From a policy perspective, the recent trend depicted in the two tables above is likely to continue. In the aftermath of Lehman, banking clients such as hedge funds in the United Kingdom are demanding "segregated accounts" (Sidley Austin, 2008) .
14 Looking forward, this may result either in the prime business changing in favor of tri-party repo-financing and/or assigned custody, or in a move to a U.S. brokerage. In general, if the financial crisis deepens, there will be an increasing tendency for those providing collateral to counterparties to ask for it to be segregated from the counterparty's assets and to place limits on its further use.
APPENDIX I. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT'S RULE 15C3-3
In essence, Rule 15c3-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prevents a broker-dealer from using its customers' securities to finance its proprietary activities. The rule has three principal requirements:
• A broker-dealer must maintain possession or control of certain customer securities (all fully paid securities and excess margin customer securities i.e., securities in a customer's margin account that exceed 140 percent of the margin debit in their account.)
• As to customer cash, a broker-dealer must deposit the cash or "qualified securities" of like value in a special account known as the "reserve account". In other words, the broker-dealer is required to segregate all customer cash or money obtained from the use of customer property that has not been used to finance transactions of other customers.
• As to customer securities that are not required to be in the broker's control (e.g., those securities posted as required collateral that can be pledged as collateral to third parties), the broker-dealer is subject to limits on the amount it can borrow against such securities.
The customer protection rule is designed to work in conjunction with the Federal bankruptcy scheme for broker-dealers created by SIPA.
A. Customer
"Customer" includes any person from whom or on whose behalf a broker-dealer holds securities or cash unless specifically excluded.
Customer excludes:
• Subordinated lenders to the broker-dealer;
• Other brokers or dealers and municipal securities dealers or government securities broker-dealers; and
• Counterparties to repo and stock lending agreements.
A U.S. bank is generally a customer, even if it is affiliated with the broker-dealer. A nonbroker-dealer affiliate of the broker-dealer, even a subsidiary, can be a customer.
B. Control Requirement
The broker-dealer must obtain and maintain physical possession or control of all customer fully-paid and excess margin securities. A good control location is a U.S. bank. Outside the United States, securities can be held at a non-U.S. bank, broker or dealer, depository or clearing agency designated by the SEC. In addition, the SEC has permitted service firms affiliated with a foreign investment company that performs various services for the fund to serve as foreign control locations. Control means that the securities are located in an account in the name of the broker-dealer at a clearing corporation, depository or bank, free of any lien.
C. Types of Securities
The customer protection rule divides securities held or purchased by a broker-dealer into four categories:
• "Fully-paid securities", which are generally held in the cash account into which a customer has actually made full payment;
• "Excess margin securities", which are that portion of a customer's margin securities having a market value that exceeds 140 percent of the customer's debit balance to the broker-dealer;
• "Margin securities", which are customer securities held in a margin, or any other Regulation T account for which a customer has not made full payment. Margin securities are not subject to the possession and control requirement, so a broker-dealer can use these securities in its own business, subject to certain limitations; and
• Non-customer securities (proprietary positions, for example).
Fully paid securities and "excess margin securities" cannot be rehypothecated (they have to be "controlled"). A broker-dealer has the right to rehypothecate customer (margin) securities when the customer pledges those securities to the broker-dealer to support a margin debit. Under Rule 15c3-3, the broker-dealer may use an amount up to 140 percent of the customer's debit balance.
